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Veil piercing doctrines have been the subject of much scholarly
attention in recent years.1 They have generated diametrically
opposing views, with some legal commentators advocating the
complete abolition of the doctrines and others advocating a
significant relaxation of the standards for piercing the corporate veil.
Those who advocate abolition of these doctrines argue that
limited liability for corporations has significant economic benefits.2
These scholars argue that aside from reducing the costs of equity
ownership and facilitating economic growth, limited liability
facilitates diversification of investment, reduces monitoring costs,
increases liquidity of shares, and encourages managers to undertake
beneficial projects that otherwise might be deemed too risky.
Allowing plaintiffs to pierce the corporate veil and the shield of
limited liability removes these benefits and creates uncertainty for
1. The scholarly interest in this topic is fueled, in part, by its practical significance.
Many commentators have asserted that “the problem is one of the most frequently litigated in
all of corporate law.” Stephen B. Presser, The Bogalusa Explosion, “Single Business Enterprise,”
“Alter Ego,” and Other Errors: Academics, Economics, Democracy, and Shareholder Limited
Liability: Back Towards a Unitary “Abuse” Theory of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 100 NW. U. L.
REV. 405, 411 (2006); see also Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Preserving LLC Veil Piercing: A
Response to Bainbridge, 31 J. CORP. L. 1063, 1065 (2006) (“Veil piercing has been one of the
most hotly debated concepts in business law.”); Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and
Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80, 81 (1991) (“The limited liability of corporate
shareholders is one of the most controversial issues in corporate law.”); Robert B. Thompson,
The Limits of Liability in the New Limited Liability Entities, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 7
(1997) (“Piercing the corporate veil is the most litigated issue in corporate law.”).
2. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 495
(2001) (“[T]here is a widely shared view that limited liability was, and remains, essential to
attracting the enormous amount of investment capital necessary for industrial corporations to
arise and flourish.”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 90–98 (1985); Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing
of the Corporation: Limited Liability, Democracy, and Economics, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 148, 164
(1992) (“If it is true that the original justification of limited liability was that it encourages
investment in the small firm, or investment by entrepreneurs of modest means, and if we are
still interested in encouraging individual entrepreneurship through incorporation, this ought to
be, perhaps, the most crucial aspect to be considered in veil-piercing doctrine.”).
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investors and other corporate stakeholders—particularly in light of
the standards applied by courts that are often less than clear.
In contrast, those who seek to relax the requirements for
piercing the corporate veil argue that limited liability improperly
shifts costs onto innocent creditors.3 As a result, management may
undertake business activities that are harmful to society because they
are able to externalize the risk of such projects, resulting in a moral
hazard problem. These costs, such commentators assert, outweigh
the benefits of limited liability.
However, there may be a middle ground between these two
positions. It may be possible to identify certain areas in which all
sides agree veil piercing is inappropriate. One such area may exist
where the corporations at issue operate within an industry that is
subject to regulations that seek to prevent the sorts of conduct that
the veil piercing doctrines are designed to remedy. In essence, it may
be appropriate to acknowledge a sort of regulatory preemption in
such circumstances given that that regulation mitigates the costs
associated with limited liability.
Part I of this Article discusses the standards courts apply in
determining whether to pierce the corporate veil. The law recognizes
a strong presumption in favor of preserving limited liability.
Accordingly, the test for piercing the corporate veil is a stringent
one. Generally, courts require that the party seeking to overcome
limited liability demonstrate that there is significant “domination and
control” over the entity whose veil is to be pierced, that there is an
element of fraud in the use of the corporate form that warrants
disregarding it, and that the fraudulent use of the corporate form has
caused plaintiffs some injury. Courts have developed a number of
factors to assess whether these conditions have been met, none of
which is dispositive. Nonetheless, these factors tend to underscore
the high barrier a party must surmount to pierce the corporate veil.
Part II discusses some of the criticisms of the veil piercing
doctrines. Some commentators have argued that veil piercing should
be eliminated altogether because the standards articulated by courts
are so vague that they are unworkable and because the benefits of
limited liability clearly outweigh any associated costs. On the other
hand, some recent academic literature has proposed expansion of
3. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Renier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder
Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1880, 1920 (1991); Lynn M. LoPucki, The
Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1996).

1167

SMITH.FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/20/2008 11:20 AM

[2008

shareholder liability by eroding the standards for breaching the
corporate form. These proposals are often justified on the ground
that limited liability improperly allows corporations to shift the costs
of their risky activities to innocent third parties and that the benefits
associated with limited liability are not as great as some have argued.
Part III discusses examples of existing regulatory frameworks that
govern many of the same activities that determine whether courts
will pierce the corporate veil. While the principles articulated in this
Article may be widely applicable, the Article focuses in particular on
regulations governing the insurance and banking industries.
Regulatory frameworks, such as those found in these industries,
ensure that corporations are not subject to the sort of “domination
and control” necessary to pierce the corporate veil and that the
corporate form is not misused for some fraudulent purpose.
Accordingly, the regulatory framework seeks to prevent the very
conduct that the veil piercing doctrines are designed to remedy.
Regulators in multiple states constantly monitor corporate
entities operating within the insurance industry, for example, to
ensure that they remain adequately capitalized and capable of
meeting their obligations to policyholders. Likewise, federal
regulators in the banking industry seek to ensure that banks are
adequately capitalized and that transactions among entities within a
corporate structure do not undermine their financial security. Such
regulations construct a series of legal “firewalls” among the
companies to prevent any inappropriate transfer of assets from one
entity to another. Such regulatory frameworks also preclude the sort
of “domination and control” that is necessary to establish alter ego
liability. Regulators monitor corporations operating within the
industry to ensure that they observe corporate formalities.
Accordingly, the rationale behind the veil piercing doctrines simply
does not apply.
Finally, Part IV offers a modest proposal for limitation of the veil
piercing doctrine that commentators on both ends of the academic
spectrum should embrace. Courts should not apply this doctrine to
companies that operate within a regulatory framework that
essentially precludes alter ego relationships.4 In such circumstances,
the dangers the veil piercing doctrines seek to remedy are already
4. This article treats the veil piercing and alter ego doctrines as synonymous. See
Outokumpu Eng’g Enters. v. Kvaerner Enviropower, 685 A.2d 724, 729 (Del. Super. Ct.
1996) (noting that alter ego theory and veil piercing are “analogous”).
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mitigated. Moreover, corporations operating within such regulatory
frameworks have a legitimate expectation that they will not be
subject to such liability.
Accordingly, the rationale for maintaining limited liability under
such circumstances is even stronger. Such regulatory frameworks
reduce the economic costs of limited liability and preserve the
benefits. Conversely, veil piercing in such circumstances only results
in additional, and unnecessary, costs given that entities operating
within these industries already incur the costs associated with the
regulatory framework that mitigates the same dangers that veil
piercing is designed to prevent. In these circumstances, the case for
veil piercing is substantially weaker.
I. STANDARDS FOR PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
The presumption of limited shareholder liability is a “bedrock”
principle of corporate law.5 “[D]istinct corporations, even parent and
subsidiary corporations, are presumed separate.”6 Indeed, this has
been the case “since the earliest days of our corporate law.”7 As a
consequence, “[s]hareholder protection through the corporate form
is ‘ingrained in our economic and legal systems.’”8 Moreover, the
limited liability associated with the corporate form has played a
significant role “‘in the expansion of industry and in the growth of
trade and commerce.’”9 Courts and legislatures have long recognized
that “‘furthering of capital formation could best be accomplished by
5. Escobedo v. BHM Health Assocs., Inc., 818 N.E.2d 930, 933 (Ind. 2004);
WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, 1 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 43
(perm. ed., rev. vol. 2006) [hereinafter FLETCHER] (“As a general rule, two separate
corporations are regarded as distinct legal entities even if the stock of one is owned wholly or
partly by the other. . . . Thus, generally, absent fraud or bad faith, a parent corporation will not
be liable for the acts of its subsidiary.”).
6. Greater Hammond Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. Mutka, 735 N.E.2d 780, 784 (Ind. 2000)
(citing McQuade v. Draw Tite Inc., 659 N.E.2d 1016, 1020 (Ind. 1995)); see also Hickman v.
Rawls, 638 S.W.2d 100, 102 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (“The general rule is that a corporate
entity may not be ignored.”); Hillsborough Holdings Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 166 B.R. 461,
468 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) (“Delaware courts disregard the corporate entity in only the
most extraordinary cases.”).
7. Winkler v. V.G. Reed & Sons, Inc., 638 N.E.2d 1228, 1232 (Ind. 1994).
8. Hambleton Bros. Lumber Co. v. Balkin Enters., Inc., 397 F.3d 1217, 1227 (9th
Cir. 2005) (quoting William O. Douglas & Carrol M. Shanks, Insulation from Liability
Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193, 193 (1929)); see also Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 2, at 89 (“Limited liability is a fundamental principle of corporate law.”).
9. Hambleton Bros., 397 F.3d at 1227 (quoting Douglas & Shanks, supra note 8, at
193).
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encouraging shareholders to invest through limiting their
liability.’”10 As a result, “[l]imited liability is the rule not the
exception; and on that assumption large undertakings are rested, vast
enterprises are launched, and huge sums of capital attracted.”11
Given the critical importance of limited liability in our economic
and legal systems, “the burden on a party seeking to ‘pierce the
corporate veil’ is severe.”12 “‘[C]ourts will pierce the corporate veil
only in exceptional circumstances.’”13 Accordingly, disregarding the
corporate form and imposing liability on affiliated corporate entities
is an “extreme remedy, sparingly used.”14 A party seeking to
disregard the corporate form must show that it was “‘so ignored,
controlled or manipulated’” that the subsidiary was “‘merely the
instrumentality of another and that the misuse of the corporate form
would constitute a fraud or promote injustice.’”15
In a breach of contract case, the burden is even higher than the
normally severe burden imposed upon a plaintiff seeking to pierce
the corporate veil.16 The burden on plaintiffs “must be more
10. Aronson v. Price, 644 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Ind. 1995) (quoting Presser, supra note 2,
at 155).
11. Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944); see also FLETCHER, supra note 5, §
41.10 (“Courts generally apply the alter ego rule with great caution and reluctance. In fact,
many courts require exceptional circumstances before disregarding the corporate form.”).
12. Escobedo v. BHM Health Assocs., Inc., 818 N.E.2d 930, 933 (Ind. 2004)
(quoting Aronson, 644 N.E.2d at 867); see also Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Gardner, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 918, 922 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (“It is the plaintiff’s burden to overcome the
presumption of the separate existence of the corporate entity.” (citing MacPherson v.
Eccleston, 190 Cal. App. 2d 24, 27 (1961))). Several courts have held that an alter ego
relationship must be demonstrated by “clear and convincing” evidence. See, e.g., Kaplan v. First
Options of Chicago, 19 F.3d 1503, 1522 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Because alter ego is akin to and has
elements of fraud, . . . it . . . must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.”).
13. Calvert v. Huckins, 875 F. Supp. 674, 678 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting National
Precast Crypt Co. v. Dy-Core of Pa., Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1186, 1192 (W.D. Pa. 1992)).
14. Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Super. Ct., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824, 836 (Cal. Ct. App.
2000) (citing Calvert, 875 F. Supp. at 677); see also Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 507
(“Control is the common (if sometimes implicit) feature of all the concepts used to describe
cases in which veil piercing is appropriate.”).
15. Escobedo, 818 N.E.2d at 933 (quoting Aronson, 644 N.E.2d at 867).
16. Carte Blanche (Singapore) PTE., Ltd. v. Diners Club Int’l, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 908,
913 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“[P]resumption [of limited liability] is particularly strong in contract
cases, in which plaintiff has chosen the party with which it has contracted, and may negotiate
guarantees or other security arrangements.”); Lucas v. Tex. Indus., Inc., 696 S.W.2d 372, 375
(Tex. 1984) (“Courts have generally been less reluctant to disregard the corporate entity in
tort cases than in breach of contract cases.”); FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 41.85 (“[C]ourts
usually apply more stringent standards to piercing the corporate veil in contract cases than they
do in tort cases.”).
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stringent in contract cases than in tort cases because in contract cases
the plaintiff has an opportunity to select the entity with which he
deals as opposed to tort cases in which no such choice exists.”17 As
several courts have recognized,
[t]he attempt to hold a parent corporation [liable] where the claim
asserted is of contractual origin presents added difficulties. The very
reasonable question must be met and answered why one who
contracted with the subsidiary and received the promise which he
bargained for but who has been disappointed in the fulfillment by
the subsidiary of its commitment should be allowed to look to the
parent. As a matter of contract right it is evident he may not.
Additional compelling facts must appear.18

In assessing whether to pierce the corporate veil, courts generally
apply a range of factors, none of which by itself is sufficient to
establish liability.19 These factors, however, tend to be designed to
ascertain whether certain, more fundamental, elements are met. In
order to pierce the corporate veil or establish alter ego liability, it is
generally necessary to show that a parent or affiliated entity exercised
domination or control over the entity at issue, that there was an
element of fraud or abuse of the corporate form, and that the
fraudulent abuse of the corporate form caused a tangible injury.20
17. Hickman v. Rawls, 638 S.W.2d 100, 102 (Tex. App. 1982) (citing Hanson Corp. v.
Dal-Mac Constr. Co., 554 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977)); see also Edwards Co. v.
Monogram Indus., Inc., 730 F.2d 977, 981 (5th Cir. 1984)); Cambridge Elecs. Corp. v.
MGA Elecs., Inc., 227 F.R.D. 313, 331 n.50 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“Courts are less likely to
apply the alter ego doctrine where the party seeking to invoke it . . . voluntarily transacted
business with the corporate entity.” (citing Energy & Metals Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557,
1577 (10th Cir. 1990))).
18. Edwards Co., 730 F.2d at 981 (quoting Bell Oil & Gas Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp.,
431 S.W.2d 336, 339–40 (Tex. 1968)); see also Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper, 781 S.W.2d 618,
623 (Tex. App. 1989) (“[C]ourts are more likely to disregard the corporate fiction in tort
cases than in contract cases, like this one, because the risk of loss in a contract case is
apportioned in prior dealings, when the bargain is first struck.” (citing Lucas, 696 S.W.2d at
375)), rev’d on other grounds, 802 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. 1990).
19. See, e.g., W. Passalacqua Builders v. Resnick Developers S., Inc., 933 F.2d 131, 139
(2d Cir. 1991) (listing factors); Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 26 Cal. Rptr.
806, 813–15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962) (listing factors).
20. Fletcher summarizes these requirements as follows:
[C]ourts will disregard the existence of a corporate entity when the plaintiff shows:
(1) control, not merely majority or complete stock control, but complete
domination, not only of the finances, but of policy and business practice in respect
to the transaction so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time
no separate mind, will or existence of its own; and (2) that such control was used by
the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of the statutory
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A. Domination and Control
“Domination and control” means more than the ordinary
control that accompanies the normal parent-subsidiary relationship.
A parent corporation “may be directly involved in financing and
macro-management of its subsidiaries . . . without exposing itself to a
charge that each subsidiary is merely its alter ego.”21 Indeed, parent
corporations are “almost always ‘active participants’” in the affairs of
their subsidiaries, and in most circumstances such participation is
“entirely permissible.”22 “Appropriate parental involvement includes:
‘monitoring of the subsidiary’s performance, supervision of the
subsidiary’s finance and capital budget decisions, and articulation of
general policies and procedures.’”23 Accordingly, the standard level
of “control” accompanying a parent-subsidiary relationship is
insufficient in itself to establish this prong of the veil piercing test.
For “it is hornbook law that ‘the exercise of the “control” which
stock ownership gives to the stockholders . . . will not create liability
beyond the assets of the subsidiary.’”24 Something more is required.
In order to establish alter ego liability or pierce the corporate
veil, plaintiffs must show that the parent exercised “exclusive
domination and . . . control to the point that [the subsidiary] no
longer has legal or independent significance of [its] own.”25 “The
parent’s general executive control over the subsidiary is not enough;
rather there must be a strong showing beyond simply facts

or other positive legal duty, or to commit a dishonest and unjust act in
contravention of the plaintiff’s legal rights; and (3) that the aforesaid control and
breach of duty proximately caused the injury or unjust loss.
FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 41.10; see also Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability:
Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 1, 9 (1994).
21. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 927 (9th Cir. 2001).
22. Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739, 759 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting Secon Serv.
Sys., Inc. v. St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co., 855 F.2d 406, 415 (7th Cir. 1988)).
23. Doe, 248 F.3d at 926 (quoting United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 69
(1998)).
24. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 62 (quoting Douglas & Shanks, supra note 8, at 196).
25. Outokumpu Eng’g Enters., Inc. v. Kvaerner Enviropower, Inc., 685 A.2d 724, 729
n.2 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996) (alterations in original) (quoting Hart Holding Co. v. Drexel
Burnham Lambert, Inc., C.A. No. 11514, 1992 WL 127567, at *11 (Del. Ch. May 28,
1992)); see also Wallace v. Wood, 752 A.2d 1175, 1183–84 (Del. Ch. 1999) (“‘[P]laintiffs
must allege facts that, if taken as true, demonstrate the Officers’ and/or Parents’ complete
domination and control of the [subsidiary].’” (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Linear Films, Inc.,
718 F. Supp. 260, 271 (D. Del. 1989))).
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evidencing ‘the broad oversight typically indicated by [the] common
ownership and common directorship’ present in a normal parentsubsidiary relationship.”26 “As a practical matter, the parent must be
shown to have moved beyond the establishment of general policy
and direction for the subsidiary and in effect taken over performance
of the subsidiary’s day-to-day operations in carrying out that
policy.”27 Even “widespread involvement” in financial and
management decisions is not sufficient to establish liability.28
1. Corporate formalities
Courts consider a number of factors in determining whether the
requisite domination and control exists in a given case. One of the
most frequently cited factors in determining whether there has been
excessive domination or control is the corporation’s compliance with
corporate formalities, such as maintaining separate corporate books,
hiring an independent auditor, and maintaining an independent
board that holds regular meetings.29 While this factor is frequently
cited, it is not often dispositive given that “mere failure upon
occasion to follow all the forms prescribed by law for the conduct of
corporate activities will not justify [disregard of the corporate
entity].”30

26. Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Super. Ct., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824, 838–39 (Cal. Ct. App.
2000) (brackets in original) (quoting Calvert v. Huckins, 875 F. Supp. 674, 679 (E.D. Cal.
1995)).
27. Id. (citing Calvert, 875 F. Supp. at 679); see also Allen v. Oberdorfer Foundries,
Inc., 595 N.Y.S.2d 995, 996 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (“The parent corporation must exercise
complete domination and control of the subsidiary’s everyday operations.” (citing Pebble Cove
Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Fid. N.Y. FSB, 153 A.D.2d 843 (N.Y. 1989))).
28. Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., 843 F.2d 145, 151 (3d Cir. 1988).
29. See generally FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 41.31 (noting that when courts determine
whether corporate formalities were observed, they examine many factors including whether
corporations were separately incorporated, had separate boards of directors, kept separate
accounting and tax records, and had separate facilities and operating personnel); see also In re
Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 837 F. Supp. 1128, 1133 (N.D. Ala. 1993)
(observing that corporate formalities include corporation’s “maintaining its own books; filing
its own tax returns; hiring its own auditor; employing its own officers, management and
workers; owning and operating its own plants . . . ; [and] holding its own stockholders’ and
directors’ meetings”), vacated in part on other grounds, 884 F. Supp. 1455 (N.D. Ala. 1995);
In re Acushnet River & New Bedrod Harbor Proceedings, 675 F. Supp. 22, 35 (D. Mass.
1987).
30. Curtis v. Feurhelm, 335 N.W.2d 575, 576–77 (S.D. 1983) (brackets in original)
(citing Larson v. Western Underwriters Inc., 77 S.D. 157, 167 (1958)); see also Thompson,
supra note 1, at 18 (“The failure to follow corporate formalities has been questioned as a basis
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Moreover, the lack of corporate formalities is arguably irrelevant
unless it leads to improper “control” or “manipulation” of the
subsidiary corporation. Without such manipulation or control, the
nexus between the actions of one entity and another required to
establish liability is lacking. Accordingly, adherence to corporate
formalities is only one element in the analysis.
2. Adequate capitalization
A factor that is perhaps more important is whether the
corporation has been adequately capitalized. Here too, however,
there are appropriately stringent requirements for establishing the
sort of inadequate capitalization that may support piercing the veil of
limited liability. “‘Inadequate capitalization means capitalization very
small in relation to the nature of the business of the corporation and
the risks attendant to such businesses.’”31 To fall below the requisite
threshold, the capital “placed in the subordinate” must be “illusory
or trifling compared with the business to be done and the risks of
loss.”32
Moreover, generally one must look to the capitalization of the
corporation when it is formed—not during subsequent periods of
operation. “‘A corporation that was adequately capitalized when
formed, but which subsequently suffers financial reverses is not
undercapitalized.’”33 Accordingly, “undercapitalization, when
considered at all, is evaluated with emphasis on the time of

for piercing in corporations generally and does not seem to have a direct effect on a large
percentage of piercing cases.”).
31. Community Care Centers, Inc. v. Hamilton, 774 N.E.2d 559, 565 (Ind. Ct. App.
2002) (quoting FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 41.33).
32. FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 41.33; see also Automotriz Del Golfo De California S.A.
de C.V. v. Resnick, 306 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1957) (explaining that “undercapitalized” means that
the amount of capital is “illusory or trifling compared with the business to be done and the
risks of loss” (quoting BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 302–03 (rev. ed. 1976))).
33. Hamilton, 774 N.E.2d at 565 (quoting FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 41.33). While
some courts have looked at “siphoning” of funds from one corporate entity to another as one
factor in determining whether the veil should be pierced, most courts recognize that such
transfers may be perfectly normal:
Alter ego status cannot be inferred whenever a shareholder withdraws some monies
from a corporation without formally declaring a dividend or executing a note even if
one of the withdrawals is made while the corporation is insolvent. If it did, every
payment to a stockholder during insolvency would justify piercing the corporate veil.
Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, 19 F.3d 1503, 1522 (3d Cir. 1994).
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incorporation rather than thereafter.”34 In fact, some courts have
held that “[t]he filing of articles of incorporation by the secretary of
state may be conclusive proof that the incorporators satisfied all
conditions precedent to incorporation, including adequate
capitalization.”35
While courts do not always clearly articulate the standards for
assessing the adequacy of capitalization, in the bankruptcy context
courts have developed standards for assessing the solvency of
corporations entering the bankruptcy system that provide useful
guidance. “Foremost among the standards” for determining whether
a corporation is “undercapitalized” under this line of authority is
“the opinion of a skilled financial analyst” regarding whether the
corporation’s capital was “insufficient to support a business of the
size and nature . . . in light of the circumstances existing at the time
the [company] was capitalized.”36
Courts applying these guidelines have made clear that it is
improper to judge undercapitalization using hindsight.37 As these
courts recognize, “[t]esting [undercapitalization] by hindsight will
. . . turn up too many false positive results of undercapitalization.”38
This is because “[o]wners owe no duty to recapitalize a failing firm,
and courts should not introduce one through the back door by
retrospectively finding undercapitalization by proof of ‘eventual
failure.’”39 If such retroactive analysis is applied in judging the
adequacy of capitalization, then “every firm that slips into insolvency
can be termed undercapitalized.”40
34. Secon Serv. Sys., Inc. v. St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co., 855 F.2d 406, 416 (7th Cir.
1988) (citing Consumer’s Co-op of Walworth County v. Olsen, 419 N.W.2d 211, 218–19
(Wis. 1988); DeWitt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir.
1976)); see also In re Hillsborough Holdings Corp., 176 B.R. 223, 234 (M.D. Fla. 1994)
(“[I]nadequate capitalization refers to the amount of capital provided to a subsidiary upon its
formation.” (citing In re Multiponics, Inc., 622 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980))); FLETCHER, supra
note 5, § 41.33 (“The adequacy of capital is to be measured as of the time of formation of the
corporation. A corporation that was adequately capitalized when formed, but which
subsequently suffers financial reverses is not undercapitalized.”).
35. FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 41.33 (citing Wilkerson v. Wegner, 793 P.2d 983
(Wash. Ct. App. 1990)).
36. In re Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d 692, 703 (5th Cir. 1977); see also In re Lifschultz
Fast Freight, 132 F.3d 339, 351 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Mobile Steel, 563 F.2d at 703).
37. See, e.g., In re Lifschultz, 132 F.3d at 351–52; Secon Serv., 855 F.2d at 416; In re
Mobile Steel, 563 F.2d at 703.
38. In re Lifschultz, 132 F.3d at 352.
39. Id. (quoting In re Mobile Steel, 563 F.2d at 703).
40. Id. at 351–52.
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Even where this factor applies, again, it is generally deemed
insufficient by itself to establish alter ego liability.41 As the Seventh
Circuit recently observed: “[W]e are unaware of any decision relying
on undercapitalization alone as grounds for disregarding the
corporate entity in a contract case . . . . A requirement to provide
continuing capitalization, as [plaintiff] urges, probably would injure
noncontrolling creditors rather than helping them, by precipitating
unnecessary forced sales.”42
Courts impose these stringent standards to avoid transforming
veil piercing into a mechanism for holding a parent liable whenever
the funds of its subsidiary are insufficient to pay a potential
judgment.43 “[T]he mere fact that an entity may or may not have the
capital to respond to a potential large award against it does not
justify piercing the corporate veil.”44 Rather, undercapitalization is
relevant only when it demonstrates that the corporate form is merely
a sham. In a company that was adequately capitalized from the
outset, subsequent losses that lead to a lack of adequate capital
provide no such evidence.
3. Intercompany transactions and commingling of assets
Another factor courts frequently invoke in conducting a veil
piercing analysis is whether there were inappropriate transactions
among corporate entities. These intercompany transactions may be
cited as evidence of “domination and control” or as a means for
siphoning off funds from one corporate entity to another.
Nonetheless, courts have been hesitant to place emphasis on this
factor in determining whether to impose alter ego liability. As a
number of courts have observed, “[t]ransactions between
corporations are legitimate and commonplace, and, when between
one company and another with a significant or even controlling
41. See LoPucki, supra note 3, at 23 (lamenting the fact that “the strategist nearly
always can prevail by undercapitalizing the company and making sure no other factors favoring
disregard [of the corporate form] are present”).
42. Secon Serv. Sys., 855 F.2d at 416; see also Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 521 (noting
“courts’ well-nigh universal refusal to treat undercapitalization, standing alone, as dispositive”
when determining whether to pierce the corporate veil).
43. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 837 F. Supp. 1128, 1138
(N.D. Ala. 1993); see also Hillsborough Holdings Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 166 B.R. 461, 475
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994).
44. Oriental Commercial and Shipping Co. v. Rosseel, N.V., 702 F. Supp. 1005, 1020
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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stock ownership in the former, do not necessarily suggest improper
domination or a failure of the parties to respect their separate
corporate identities.”45
Indeed, far from suggesting any domination or control of a
corporate subsidiary, intercompany transactions may establish the
independence of corporate entities. Courts have held, for example,
that “[t]he fact that [a parent corporation] requires the subsidiaries
to pay a fee” for services actually “supports [the parent’s] argument
that it is not the alter ego of any of its subsidiaries.”46 Were corporate
formalities ignored, such arms-length transactions would not exist.
In contrast, commingling of assets may present a risk of an
inappropriate alter ego relationship.47 Where a corporation
commingles its assets with those of shareholders, courts are more
likely to find that the corporation is not separate and distinct from its
shareholders. Such commingling is distinct from typical corporate
transactions—such as where a parent gives its subsidiary financing to
conduct its business operations.48
4. Overlap in officers and directors
Litigants also occasionally point to an overlap in the leadership of
corporate entities as evidence in support of piercing the corporate
veil. However, as the Supreme Court has made clear, overlap in
directors or officers among affiliated corporate entities is not
unusual, and is generally held to be insufficient to establish alter ego
liability alone:

45. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants, 837 F. Supp. at 1134.
46. Joiner v. Ryder Sys. Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1478, 1486 (C.D. Ill. 1996) (emphasis
added); see also In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants, 837 F. Supp. at 1135 (“[A]rrangements—
involving the payment of consideration for services rendered—during the formative years of a
subsidiary’s existence do not suggest a degree of involvement by the parent that supports a
claim for piercing the corporate veil many years later.”); Connors v. Peles, 724 F. Supp. 1538,
1568 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (no alter ego liability where “management fees were paid by
[subsidiaries] for services rendered”).
47. FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 41.50, at 246–47 (“Evidence that shareholders used
corporate funds for personal purposes, mixed corporate and personal accounts, or commingled
assets so that the ownership interests were indistinguishable will be weighed, along with other
factors, when a disregard of corporate separateness is urged.”).
48. Id. at 249 (“In the parent/subsidiary context, a court will not pierce the corporate
veil merely because the parent and subsidiary issued consolidated financial statements, or
because the parent provided financing to the subsidiary.”).
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[I]t is entirely appropriate for directors of a parent corporation to
serve as directors of its subsidiary, and that fact alone may not serve
to expose the parent corporation to liability for its subsidiary’s
acts . . . . This recognition that the corporate personalities remain
distinct has its corollary in the “well established principle [of
corporate law] that directors and officers holding positions with a
parent and its subsidiary can and do ‘change hats’ to represent the
two corporations separately, despite their common ownership.”49

Thus, “[w]hile stock control and common directors and officers
are generally prerequisites” for imposing alter ego liability, “they are
not sufficient by themselves to bring the rule into operation.”50
Indeed, “[p]arents and subsidiaries frequently have overlapping
boards of directors while maintaining separate business
operations.”51 In practice, therefore, this factor is not particularly
useful, and certainly not dispositive, in determining whether the
corporate veil should be pierced or alter ego liability imposed.
5. Miscellaneous factors
Finally, there are a number of miscellaneous factors that courts
sometimes consider in assessing veil piercing claims, most of which
are generally deemed to be of limited relevance. One such factor is
the filing of consolidated financial statements or tax returns.
However, courts have held that a parent corporation’s “decision to
include [its subsidiary] in its consolidated tax return hardly
demonstrates domination” and is insufficient to establish even a
“prima facie” case to pierce the corporate veil.52 Similarly, courts “do
not consider the fact of consolidated financial reports to be a
sufficient basis to impose liability under the alter ego doctrine.”53 As

49. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 69 (1998) (quoting Lusk v. Foxmeyer
Health Corp., 129 F.3d 773, 779 (5th Cir. 1997) and Am. Protein Corp. v. AB Volvo, 844
F.2d 56, 57 (2d Cir. 1988)).
50. Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical, 324 F.2d 157, 161 (7th Cir. 1963); see also
Akzona, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 607 F. Supp. 227, 237 (D. Del. 1984)
(holding that overlapping directors was insufficient to pierce veil); Scott-Douglas Corp. v.
Greyhound Corp., 304 A.2d 309, 314 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973) (same).
51. Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1460 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Calvert v.
Huckins, 875 F. Supp. 674, 678 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (“Courts have repeatedly held that [factors
such as some interlocking directors and officers] do not justify piercing the corporate veil.”).
52. AT&T Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 1996).
53. Lowell Staats Min. Co. v. Pioneer Uravan, Inc., 878 F.2d 1259, 1264 (10th Cir.
1989).
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with overlapping directors and corporate officers, “consolidating the
activities of a subsidiary into the parent’s annual reports is a common
business practice. It is allowed by both the Internal Revenue Service
and the Securities and Exchange Commission, and it is
recommended by generally accepted accounting principles.”54
Another factor that courts sometimes consider is the operation of
multiple corporate entities from a centralized location. While
plaintiffs sometimes point to the fact that affiliated companies have
the same corporate headquarters as evidence of “domination and
control,” a number of courts have likewise noted that “‘[t]he
separate corporate entities of two corporations may not be
disregarded merely because one owns the stock of another or
because the two share common directors or occupy the same office
space.’”55 The physical location of the two entities is simply not
particularly dispositive of whether they are alter egos. Moreover,
there are many perfectly legitimate reasons two corporate entities
may share a single physical location.
B. Fraud and Misuse of the Corporate Form
Not only must plaintiffs demonstrate “domination and control”
in order to pierce the corporate veil or establish alter ego liability,
but typically they also bear the burden of demonstrating that there
was “misuse of the corporate form constituting fraud or promoting
injustice.”56 Domination or control of a subsidiary by a corporate

54. Calvert, 875 F. Supp. at 678–79; see also Dalton v. R & W Marine, Inc., 897 F.2d
1359, 1363 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding no alter ego liability even though parent remained
responsible for general policy, received money from subsidiaries that was funneled into
centralized bank accounts, filed a consolidated tax return, and offered benefit plans to its
subsidiaries’ employees); O'Berry v. McDermott, Inc., 712 S.W.2d 206, 207 (Tex. App. 1986)
(holding that overlapping directors and officers, filing consolidated tax returns, maintaining
employee benefits for subsidiary, capitalizing and financing the subsidiary, making decisions for
subsidiary, and being regarded by the public as one business unit was insufficient to establish
alter ego relationship).
55. Hornsby v. Hornsby’s Stores, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 302, 308 (N.D. Ill. 1990)
(quoting Sumner Realty Co. v. Willcott, 499 N.E.2d 554, 557 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)); see also
13-D Elec. Co., Inc. v. Barnett Constr. Co., 706 S.W.2d 135, 140 (Tex. App. 1986)
(“Evidence that [two corporations] officed in the same building does not invoke the ‘alter ego’
theory.”).
56. Aronson v. Price, 644 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Ind. 1995); see also FLETCHER, supra note
5, § 43, at 296 (“[A]lthough corporations are related, there can be no piercing of the veil
without a showing of improper conduct.”); id. § 41.32 (“Some courts have required
intentional misconduct, while others reiterate the more general requirement that there must be
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parent is not sufficient. In order to pierce the corporate veil there
must be “evidence of fraud or misrepresentation.”57
The test in this regard is also particularly stringent. Only a
specific kind of fraud or misrepresentation is sufficient to establish
liability.
[T]he act of one corporation is not regarded as the act of another
merely because the first corporation is a subsidiary of the other, or
because the two may be treated as part of a single economic
enterprise for some other purpose. Rather, to pierce the corporate
veil based on an agency or “alter ego”’ theory, “the corporation
must be a sham and exist for no other purpose than as a vehicle for
fraud.”58

A corporation is not a “sham” or “vehicle for fraud” if it “engaged in
substantial business operations.”59 In all but the most egregious cases
this requirement will not be met.
In particular, it is well established that “[t]he underlying cause of
action does not supply the necessary fraud or injustice. To hold
otherwise would render the fraud or injustice element meaningless,
and would sanction bootstrapping.”60 Quite simply, “[t]he ‘injustice’
must be more than the breach of contract alleged in the
complaint.”61 Likewise, “[m]ere use of the corporate form to avoid
liability is insufficient to warrant piercing the veil.”62 There must be
some form of deception, injustice, defeat of public policy, or fraudulent, improper or criminal
purpose.”).
57. Extra Energy Coal Co. v. Diamond Energy and Res., Inc., 467 N.E.2d 439, 442
(Ind. Ct. App. 1984); see also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Latham & Watkins, 909 F. Supp. 923,
927, 930–31 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“Absent proof of intentionally fraudulent conduct, courts
simply do not pierce the corporate veil . . . .”); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Linear Films, 718 F. Supp.
260, 268 (D. Del. 1989).
58. In re Sunstates Corp. S’holder Litig., 788 A.2d 530, 534 (Del. Ch. 2001) (quoting
Wallace v. Wood, 752 A.2d 1175, 1184 (Del. Ch. 1999)); see also Kaplin v. First Options of
Chicago, Inc., 19 F.3d 1503 (3d Cir. 1994) (same).
59. Sunstates Corp., 788 A.2d at 534.
60. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp., 718 F. Supp. at 268; see also FLETCHER, supra note 5,
§ 41.32, at 200–02 (“A fraud or injustice which relates to ancillary activity is generally not a
sufficient basis for piercing the corporate veil.”).
61. Outokumpu Eng’g Enters. v. Kvaerner EnviroPower, 685 A.2d 724, 729 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1996).
62. Itel Containers Intern. Corp. v. Atlanttrafik Exp. Serv. Ltd., 909 F.2d 698, 704 (2d
Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 982 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Radeszewski v.
Telecom Corp., 981 F.2d 305, 311 (8th Cir. 1992) (“The doctrine of limited liability is
intended precisely to protect a parent corporation whose subsidiary goes broke.”); Zubik v.
Zubik, 384 F.2d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 1967) (“Limiting one’s personal liability is a traditional
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evidence that the misuse of the corporate form perpetrated a fraud on
the plaintiffs.63
The requirement that the alleged misuse of the corporate form
constitute a fraud or misrepresentation is particularly difficult to
meet in contract cases. As the Seventh Circuit observed in Secon
Service Systems, courts generally require “more than control to pierce
the corporate veil for the benefit of contract creditors.”64 The reason
for this is simple: “[U]nless the corporation engaged in some
practice that might have misled its contract creditors into thinking
they were dealing with another entity, there simply is no need to
‘protect’ them.”65 This is because, “[u]nlike tort claimants, they
chose to deal with the corporation; to allow them access to
shareholders or parent corporations when the deal goes sour is to
give them more than the benefit of their bargain.”66
Even in cases that do not involve contract claims, plaintiffs
seeking to pierce the corporate veil face a high burden. At a
minimum, they must establish that the defendant’s conduct was
somehow intentionally “wrongful”—i.e., that defendants committed
some act “akin to fraud or deception.”67 Thus, parties seeking to
establish liability must show that the “parent is employing the
subsidiary to perpetrate a fraud or commit wrongdoing”; “[m]erely
showing control” is “insufficient to overcome th[e] presumption”
that corporate entities are separate.68
These requirements are imposed for good reason. They ensure
that the economic and legal benefits of limited liability will be
preserved and will only be breached where there has been some
abuse of the corporate form in a way that is not economically
reason for a corporation.”); Oriental Commercial and Shipping Co. v. Rosseel, N.V., 702 F.
Supp. 1005, 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“[T]he mere fact that an entity may or may not have the
capital to respond to a potential large award against it does not justify piercing the corporate
veil.”).
63. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp., 718 F. Supp. at 269 (“The law requires that fraud or
injustice be found in the defendants’ use of the corporate form.”); Resolution Trust Corp. v.
Latham & Watkins, 909 F. Supp. 923, 927, 930–31 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that courts
generally “pierce the corporate veil only upon ‘proof of deliberate misuse of the corporate
form—tantamount to fraud’”).
64. Secon Serv. Sys., Inc. v. St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co., 855 F.2d 406, 415 (7th Cir.
1988).
65. Id. at 415–16.
66. Id. at 416.
67. Hystro Prods., Inc. v. MNP Corp., 18 F.3d 1384, 1390 (7th Cir. 1994).
68. FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 43, at 289–92.
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beneficial. In sum, the corporate veil may not be pierced based on
“the mere prospect of an unsatisfied judgment.”69 If it could, the
limited liability of the corporate form would be rendered
meaningless.
C. Causation
Finally, in addition to complete domination and control and the
use of the corporate form to commit fraud or some similar wrong,
courts generally require that the fraud or wrong result in an actual
injury to the plaintiff.70 For example, when misuse of the corporate
form leads to undercapitalization and leaves plaintiffs without an
adequate monetary remedy, there may be grounds for piercing the
corporate veil.71 It is not enough that there was fraud or misuse of
the corporate form; fraud or misuse must lead to a tangible injury to
the plaintiffs.72 Thus, as in other areas of the law, there is a strong
causation requirement. The law will not provide a remedy where
there has been no injury.
II. CRITICISMS OF THE VEIL PIERCING DOCTRINES
These requirements for piercing the corporate veil have been
criticized on all sides. Some commentators have argued that the
requirements for veil piercing are too stringent and that it is unjust

69. Hystro Prods., 18 F.3d at 1390.
70. See, e.g., W. Passalacqua Builders v. Resnick Developers South, Inc., 933 F.2d 131,
138 (2d Cir. 1991); Morris v. Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 623 N.E.2d 1157, 1160–61 (N.Y.
App. 1993) (holding that plaintiffs must show that “(1) the owner[] exercised complete
domination of the corporation in respect to the transaction attacked[] and (2) that such
domination was used to commit a fraud or wrong against the plaintiff which resulted in
plaintiff’s injury”); Irwin & Leighton, Inc. v. W.M. Anderson Co., 532 A.2d 983, 987 (Del.
Ch. 1987).
71. See, e.g., Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 1967) (citing L.S. Tellier,
Annotation, Inadequate Capitalization as Factor in Disregard of Corporate Entity, 63 A.L.R.
2d. 1051 (1959)).
72. See, e.g., Radaszewski v. Telecom Corp., 981 F.2d 305, 306 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting
that there is no liability without harm); Lucas v. Texas Indus., Inc., 696 S.W.2d 372, 375
(Tex. 1985) (“If the corporation responsible for the plaintiffs’ injury is capable of paying a
judgment upon proof of liability, then no reason would exist to attempt to pierce the corporate
veil and have shareholders pay for the injury.”); see also Arch v. American Tobacco Co., 984 F.
Supp. 830, 840 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (“Courts do not pierce the corporate veil unless the
‘corporation is so undercapitalized that it is unable to meet debts that may reasonably be
expected to arise in the normal course of business.’” (quoting Laborers Clean-Up Contract
Admin. Trust Fund v. Uriarte Clean-Up Serv., Inc., 736 F.2d 516, 525 (9th Cir. 1984))).
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to shield assets from potential claimants where a related enterprise
may have received the benefits of the activity conducted by another
enterprise.73 Others have argued that the veil piercing doctrines are
harmful to economic progress and should be abandoned
altogether.74
A. Enterprise Liability and Other Doctrines Seeking to Erode the
Requirements for Piercing the Corporate Veil
The detractors of limited liability often argue that it allows
corporations to externalize the costs of their risky activities to
innocent third parties.75 A variety of academic commentators have
advocated revising or even entirely abandoning the doctrine of
limited liability. Proponents of such views often espouse some
version of “enterprise liability” to replace the traditional
requirements for piercing the corporate veil. Enterprise liability
focuses upon the control element that is traditionally part of the veil
piercing analysis.76 However, it eliminates or severely weakens the
other requirements—i.e., that there be some fraud or misuse of the
corporate form that actually causes an injury to the plaintiffs.
Moreover, it seeks to erode the traditional “control” requirement
itself. In the place of the “extraordinary” level of control that is
required under traditional veil piercing analysis, some commentators
hope to substitute the ordinary control that a parent corporation
typically exercises over its subsidiary.77 In the place of limited

73. See, e.g., PHILIP I. BLUMBERG ET AL., BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS (2005)
[hereinafter BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS]; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3.
74. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 534–35.
75. Id. at 494 (“A number of commentators have complained that limited liability
permits investors to externalize the risks of modern industrial enterprise.”). The proponents of
limited liability recognize this phenomenon, but have argued that “[t]he implications of this
point . . . are unclear, both because modifying limited liability has its costs and because moral
hazard would exist without limited liability.”); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 104.
Moreover, they note that “there is no externality with respect to voluntary creditors.” Id.
(citing Richard Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV.
499, 503 (1976)).
76. See 1 BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS, supra note 73, § 10.03[E], at 10–11
(stating that these doctrines “focus[] . . . on the common business, control, and extensive
integration of operations and management of the enterprise”); Phillip I. Blumberg, Control
and the Partly Owned Corporation: A Preliminary Inquiry Into Shared Control, 10 FLA. J.
INT’L L. 419, 424 (1996) (“Control plays a crucial role in the application of enterprise
principles wherever they have been adopted in U.S. law.”).
77. See Blumberg, supra note 76, at 426, 460.
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liability, some advocate enterprise liability as a form of strict liability
that may be asserted against parent corporations for the actions of
their subsidiaries.
Other commentators have gone even further, openly advocating
for the complete elimination of limited liability or at least the
elimination of limited liability with respect to tort creditors.78 The
rationale for such reforms is that limited liability allows shareholders
to externalize the risks of their activities and shoulders innocent
creditors with the burden. They contend, for example, that
“[p]ermitting an enterprise to avoid the full costs of its activities
creates incentives for excessive risk-taking.”79 They further argue that
“limited liability in tort permits the firm’s owners to determine
unilaterally how much of their property will be exposed to potential
tort claims, thereby inviting opportunism and inefficiency.”80 In
addition, some argue that shareholders may be superior risk-bearers
given that they are able to diversify against firm-specific risks.81
B. Calls for Abolition of the Veil Piercing Doctrine
At the same time that many academics have argued for an
expansion of corporate liability, other commentators have urged
retention of the traditional standards or even abolition of the veil
piercing doctrine in its entirety.82 One of the primary rationales for
retention of the traditional stringent standards for piercing the
corporate veil is the significant economic benefits associated with
limited liability.83 Commentators have hailed limited liability as a

78. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 1880; see also David W. Leebron,
Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1605 (1991)
(observing that “the case for limited liability with respect to tort victims is far more tenuous”
than for contract creditors).
79. Thompson, supra note 20, at 14.
80. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 1880, 1920.
81. Thompson, supra note 20, at 17 (“A dominant argument for extending liability to
shareholders rests on the superior risk-bearing ability of dispersed shareholders of public
corporations.”).
82. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 90–98; Presser, supra note 1, at
407 (“It is, or at least once was and ought again to be, hornbook law that a shareholder or a
parent corporation should not lose the protection of limited liability unless that shareholder or
parent has somehow ‘abused’ the corporate form.”).
83. Professor Bainbridge has argued that even with respect to tort creditors who may
have a stronger argument in favor of relaxation of the traditional standards, limited liability
“can be justified on grounds that it increases the size of the pie out of which the tort creditors’
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significant source of economic growth in the United States as well as
an important means by which ordinary citizens may have a chance to
move up in the social ladder by starting small businesses unhampered
by the significant threats and uncertainties associated with unlimited
liability.84 Moreover, these commentators note that limited liability
“is not unique to corporations” but is a general principle of law that
spans across many different contexts: investors’ risk is typically
limited to the amount of their investment, regardless of whether the
corporate form is involved.85 Finally, they cite a number of less
obvious economic benefits of limited liability such as encouraging
diversification of equity ownership, ensuring that positive net value
projects will not be rejected as “too risky,” and reducing monitoring
costs.86
In response to the critics of limited liability, these commentators
argue that the long-recognized benefits of limited liability exceed any
alleged costs. In particular, they observe that there is no externality
with respect to contract creditors who voluntarily contract with the
corporation. They also note that “[f]or all the academic controversy,
the evidence is hardly overwhelming that limited liability causes a
significant increase in a corporation’s willingness to engage in risky
behavior.”87 The judiciary seems to share their view, as academic
attacks on limited liability have gained little traction in the courts.88
Most of these commentators, however, do not favor abandoning
the traditional exceptions to limited liability under the veil piercing
doctrines. They recognize that “the exceptions serve valuable

claims may be satisfied by encouraging equity investment in corporations.” Bainbridge, supra
note 2, at 497.
84. See supra note 2.
85. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 90.
86. See generally id. at 93–98.
87. Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets
Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387, 421 (1992); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing LLC
Veil Piercing, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 96 (arguing that “there is no reason to believe that veil
piercing causes equity claimants to internalize the risks associated with their business’
operations” and that because of its vagueness, “[i]t seems unlikely that veil piercing even
inadvertently addresses concerns over negative externalities”); Presser, supra note 1, at 410
(arguing that it is “far from clear” that “by externalizing the costs of tortious behavior through
limited liability, we will encourage corporations to engage in more hazardous behavior”); Larry
E. Ribstein, The Deregulation of Limited Liability and the Death of Partnership, 70 WASH. U.
L.Q. 417, 439 (1992) (arguing that “the potential for externalities may be less than has been
supposed”).
88. See Bainbridge, supra note 87, at 95.
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functions” as well.89 However, they argue that the traditionally
stringent requirements for piercing the corporate veil are necessary to
ensure the preservation of limited liability as the general rule and
shareholder liability as the exception. Courts have tailored traditional
standards to hold shareholders liable only where they are directly
responsible for some wrongdoing or the corporate form is used as a
sham to perpetrate a fraud.
Nonetheless, other commentators go even further, arguing that
limited liability should be strengthened by abolishing the veil
piercing doctrines. They reason that “[t]he standards by which veil
piercing is effected are vague, leaving judges great discretion.”90 As a
result, they argue that there is “uncertainty and lack of predictability,
increasing transaction costs for small businesses,” and that there is
“no evidence that veil piercing has been rigorously applied to effect
socially beneficial policy outcomes.”91 As these commentators
observe, this vagueness and uncertainty “imposes substantial costs”
because “litigation risks cannot be confidently predicted.”92 As a
result, “parties can be deterred from engaging in socially desirable
activities or, at the least, will take excessive [and costly]
precautions.”93
In place of the veil piercing theories, critics would substitute
direct liability for shareholders who actively engage in wrongdoing.94
Thus, shareholders would be ensured that they will not be subjected
to liability unless they personally engage in some form of unlawful
conduct. This approach dispenses entirely with the laundry list of
factors typically employed in determining whether the corporate veil
should be pierced and substitutes a form of direct liability for the
indirect liability that occurs where the corporate veil has been
pierced.
While the veil piercing doctrines may not be the model of clarity
and are often based on haphazard lists of factors that courts must

89. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 89.
90. Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 481.
91. Id.; cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 109 (“The arbitrariness of the[]
nominal tests [for piercing the corporate veil] casts further doubt on the utility of the
doctrine.”).
92. Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 514.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 481–82.
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consider in determining whether to breach the corporate form,95
there are some standards that emerge from the cases that may be
used to enable more principled decision making. For example, as
noted above, the factors that courts enumerate may in reality form
categories of evidence demonstrating a handful of more fundamental
elements. The courts generally require a high level of control by
shareholders over the corporation whose veil is to be pierced as well
as an element of fraud in the misuse of the corporate form that
causes plaintiffs some tangible injury. While these more fundamental
elements are not always applied in a principled manner, courts may
rigorously apply the veil piercing doctrines if they adhere to these
categories and requirements.
Likewise, there are certain instances in which the veil piercing
doctrines are more commonly utilized. Many commentators have
noted that courts pierce the corporate veil more frequently in cases
involving closely held corporations as opposed to large, publicly
owned corporate entities.96 In such situations, the degree of direct
shareholder control is likely to be greater and the potential for
utilizing the corporate entity as a “sham” is increased.
Similarly, commentators have theorized that veil piercing may be
more common in the context of tort creditors, compared with
contract creditors. Unlike contract creditors, tort creditors do not
make a conscious decision to enter into a relationship with the
subject corporation.97 While commentators have raised questions

95. See Richard A. Booth, Limited Liability and the Efficient Allocation of Resources, 89
NW. U. L. REV. 140, 162 (1994) (“The law has never been very clear about what is the
standard for piercing the corporate veil.”).
96. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 109 (“Almost every case in which a court
has allowed creditors to reach the assets of shareholders has involved a close corporation.”);
Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV.
1036, 1047 (1991); Thompson, supra note 20, at 9 (empirical study of 1600 veil piercing
cases “found no case in which shareholders in a public corporation were held liable”); cf.
Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 503 (observing that “the tort creditor of the close corporation” is
“the hardest case in which to justify limited liability” because “the shareholders of a close
corporation frequently are actively engaged in the business on a full-time basis”). But see
Leebron, supra note 78, at 1649 (arguing that “the case for limited liability of closely held
corporations has been understated”).
97. See FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 41.85 (“[C]ourts are more likely to disregard the
corporate entity in tort cases than in cases of contract because the injured party in contract
cases had the opportunity to select the entity with whom he or she contracted; in a tort case,
no such selection is made by a plaintiff.”); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 112
(“Courts are more willing to disregard the corporate veil in tort than in contract cases. The
rationale for this distinction follows directly from the economics of moral hazard—where
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regarding whether this theory is borne out in practice,98 it provides
another means by which principled line drawing may achieve socially
desirable outcomes. Finally, commentators have observed that the
veil piercing doctrines are most often applied where the shareholders
are active participants in wrongdoing.99 In such circumstances, the
actions of the shareholders contribute to creditors’ loss and there is a
stronger case for liability. Moreover, the shareholders in closely held
corporations are more likely to undertake an active role in the
conduct of the corporation, unlike the passive investors typical of
most large, publicly held corporations who hold only a small
minority interest in the firm and have a smaller stake in its
operations.100
At bottom, this Article is agnostic with respect to these
criticisms. Whether veil piercing has become so haphazard and
unprincipled that it serves no useful purpose or whether limited
liability inefficiently and improperly shifts costs to unsuspecting
creditors, there is one area in which commentators should be able to
reach agreement. The benefits of limited liability outweigh any
associated risks within certain industries in which the regulatory
framework eliminates or mitigates the dangers associated with
limited liability. Accordingly, the arguments made by critics of
limited liability simply do not apply or are less significant under such
circumstances. Similarly, those who wish to eliminate veil piercing
doctrines in their entirety will approve this proposal as a welcome
first step.

corporations must pay for the risk faced by creditors as a result of limited liability, they are less
likely to engage in activities with social costs that exceed their social benefits.”).
98. Compare Thompson, supra note 96, at 1058, 1068 (empirical study finding that the
veil was more likely to be pierced in contract cases than in tort cases) with Presser, supra note
2, at 167–68 (concluding based on a review of leading cases that “the veil is more likely to be
pierced in tort than in contract cases”).
99. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 507 (“Minority shareholders who do not
actively participate in the corporation’s business or management are rarely held liable on a veil
piercing theory.”); Thompson, supra note 1, at 10; Thompson, supra note 20, at 9 (observing
that empirical study of 1600 veil piercing cases “found . . . no civil case in which individual
shareholders identified as passive in corporations of any size were held liable”).
100. In addition to these categories, some commentators have argued for greater veil
piercing where the shareholder is a corporation. See Presser, supra note 2, at 173 (“There has
long been a feeling on the part of some commentators . . . that it ought to be easier to pierce
the veil in the context of the parent-subsidiary relationship than in that of the individual
shareholder and his or her corporation.”).
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III. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

While there has been significant disagreement over the extent to
which courts should afford corporations the benefits of limited
liability, there may be some areas in which all commentators can
agree that it should be preserved. One such area is in the context of
regulated industries in which the regulatory framework seeks to
prevent the conduct the veil piercing doctrines seek to remedy.
While there may be other industries in which such a rule may be
appropriate,101 prime examples may be found in the insurance and
banking industries. Insurance regulators in various states have
developed a complex regulatory framework aimed at preventing the
domination and control and fraudulent use of affiliated corporate
entities. This comprehensive framework applies to the same sorts of
factors the veil piercing doctrines identify. Likewise, federal
regulators seek to ensure that banks are adequately capitalized and
that where they function within holding company systems,
intercompany transactions do not undermine their financial security.
Accordingly, a prohibition on veil piercing where such regulatory
frameworks exist may be warranted.
Holding
company
systems
composed
of
complex
interrelationships among affiliated corporate entities are common in
the insurance and banking industries and have significant advantages.
For example, “[h]olding companies can provide subsidiaries with a
level of financial flexibility, including capital infusions, access to
capital markets, and in some cases, additional cash flow sources from
other operations.”102 Such systems can also help the company
“diversify risks” among different entities engaged in different lines of
101. Professor Blumberg has observed the following:
Insurance has joined banking, savings and loan, public utilities, and casino gambling
as the areas in American federal and state law in which the holding company and the
corporate group are major subjects of regulatory concern. These statutes regulate
the holding company systems conducting the regulated activities and extend the
outer boundaries of statutory obligation to all component companies of the system
whether or not the company itself is engaged in the regulated activities. Similarly,
the statutes extend the regulatory program to apply statutory provisions regarding
disclosure and regulation of transactions with “insiders” to all companies in the
system and affiliated companies and interests as well.
Phillip I. Blumberg, The Increasing Recognition of Enterprise Principles in Determining Parent
and Subsidiary Corporation Liabilities, 28 CONN. L. REV. 295, 311 (1996); see also 3
BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS, supra note 73, §§ 120.01–120.06, 121.01–121.07, at
120-1 to 120-56 (discussing firewalls between banks and affiliated entities).
102. Preface, 2004 Best’s Insurance Reports—Life/Health, at xiii.
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business.103 In addition, they can allow specialization among
different corporate entities within the same system, utilizing
subsidiaries dedicated to providing investment management or other
corporate services. This division of labor is advantageous for all
entities within the holding company system, which benefit from the
efficiencies and reduced costs associated with this structure.104
Finally, holding companies can be advantageous from a tax
perspective; by combining losses and gains from different
subsidiaries, all companies may benefit through reduction in tax
liabilities.105 Accordingly, there are many advantages associated with
holding company systems that make them an ideal structure within
the insurance, banking, and other industries.
A. The Insurance Industry
Regulators in the insurance industry have sought to preserve the
significant benefits of holding company systems while regulating the
potential hazards associated with intercompany relationships. In the
process, they have developed regulatory frameworks on a state-bystate basis founded on model laws that closely track the potential
hazards that veil piercing doctrines are designed to remedy.
Accordingly, each state has developed detailed regulations for
monitoring the interactions among insurance companies that operate
within their jurisdiction.
1. Insurance holding company acts
Within this regulatory framework, each state has a Holding
Company Act that imposes certain requirements on the parent of an
insurance subsidiary. The National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (“NAIC”), an organization comprised of insurance
regulators in all fifty states and the District of Columbia that was
established to ensure cooperation and coordination among the state
regulators,106 has promulgated a Model Insurance Company System
103. Robert C. Clark, The Regulation of Financial Holding Companies, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 789, 823 (1979).
104. See id. at 819.
105. See id. at 818.
106. See generally 4 BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS, supra note 73, § 128.01, at
128-5 (observing that the NAIC “plays a significant role in the coordination of state
regulation”); Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism
and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 635
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Regulatory Act that has been substantially enacted in nearly all
states.107
Among other things, the statutes require disclosure and approval
of changes in control of an insurer as well as material transactions
and relationships between the insurer and the insurer’s affiliates.108
They also provide standards governing material transactions between
the insurer and the insurer’s affiliates.109 As a result, “[r]egulators
have access to the most direct and detailed information on individual
insurers through the filings made with the states. These include
annual and quarterly statements, MD&A, audited financial
statements, and filings made pursuant to the state’s Holding
Company Act and other regulatory filings.”110 Using these
submissions, regulators can easily monitor companies’ conduct and
police the interactions among corporate entities within a holding
company system.
The various state departments of insurance scrutinize insurance
subsidiaries’ conduct to prevent them from, among other things,
entering into transactions or relationships with affiliated companies
on terms that are not fair and reasonable or paying dividends to
shareholders that jeopardize the financial condition of the insurer.
Hence, insurers must file an Insurance Holding Company System
Registration Statement with their domestic regulators containing
current information regarding their various corporate structures,
financial conditions, and relationships among related companies.
Such relationships include, among other things, investments,
management and service contracts, cost-sharing arrangements,

(1999) (discussing role of the NAIC in insurance regulation and observing that it “has
increasingly assumed a national role, centralizing many basic regulatory functions and
operating as a quasi-federal agency by attempting to enforce national standards”).
107. See Insurance Holding Company System Regulatory Act, in 3 NAIC, MODEL LAWS
REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 440-1 to 440-58 (Oct. 2005) [hereinafter MODEL ACT]. For
examples of the Model Act as enacted in various states, see CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1215–1215.16
(West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 38a-129 to -140 (2005); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 18,
§§ 5001–15 (1999); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/131.1 to .28 (2000); IND. CODE ANN. §
27-1-23-1 to -13 (1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 206–206(D) (1998); and TEX. INS.
CODE ANN. § 823.001–.503 (Vernon 2007).
108. See MODEL ACT §§ 3, 5, at 440-4 to -9, 440-16 to -20.
109. See id. § 5, at 440-16 to -20; see also 4 BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS, supra
note 73, § 128.09, at 128-28 (“IHCSRA § 5(A)(1) and virtually all the state statutes establish
far-reaching standards for transactions within the holding company system.”).
110. NAIC, FRAMEWORK FOR INSURANCE HOLDING COMPANY ANALYSIS 24 (March
2002).
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reinsurance agreements, and tax allocation agreements.111 The
insurer must amend its registration statement whenever a new
affiliated transaction is executed.112
In addition, insurance holding company statutes require a
domestic insurer that is a member of an insurance holding company
system to provide regulators with notice of its intent to complete a
“material” transaction with an affiliated entity. Insurers may only
complete such transactions if the state department of insurance has
not disapproved the transactions within thirty days of receiving
notice.113 “Material” transactions include reinsurance agreements,
management agreements, service contracts, cost-sharing agreements,
certain kinds of loans, or any other transaction that the regulators
determine could impact the insurer’s policyholders.114 Likewise, an
insurer must provide notice to regulators of all dividends paid to
another corporate entity within the holding company system and
must gain approval for dividends of “extraordinary” magnitude.115
States will not approve material transactions with an affiliate and
will not allow shareholder dividends unless the transactions or
dividends leave the insurer with surplus that is reasonable in relation
to its outstanding liabilities. Regulators follow a set of statutorily
prescribed factors to determine whether an insurer’s surplus is
adequate and reasonable, which include:
The size of the insurer as measured by its assets, capital and surplus,
reserves, premium writings, insurance in force and other
appropriate criteria . . . . The quality, diversification, and liquidity

111. MODEL ACT § 4(B), at 440-14 to -15.
112. Id. § 4(A)(3), at 440-14.
113. Id. § 5(A)(2), at 440-17; see also 4 BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS, supra note
73, § 128.09, at 128-29 (discussing requirements).
114. MODEL ACT § 5(A), at 440-17 to -18.
115. Id. §§ 4(E), 5(B), at 440-15, 440-18 to -19. The Model Act provides in relevant
part:
[A]n extraordinary dividend or distribution includes any dividend or distribution of
cash or other property, whose fair market value together with that of other
dividends or distributions made within the preceding twelve (12) months exceeds
the lesser of: (1) Ten percent (10%) of the insurer’s surplus as regards policyholders
as of the 31st day of December next preceding; or (2) The net gain from operations
of the insurer, if the insurer is a life insurer, or the net income, if the insurer is not a
life insurer, not including realized capital gains, for the twelve-month period ending
the 31st day of December next preceding, but shall not include pro rata
distributions of any class of the insurer’s own securities.
Id. § 5(B), at 440-19.
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of the insurer’s investment portfolio . . . . The recent past and
projected future trend in the size of the insurer’s investment
portfolio . . . . The surplus as regards policyholders maintained by
other comparable insurers . . . . The adequacy of the insurer’s
reserves . . . . [And] [t]he quality and liquidity of investments in
affiliates.116

Moreover, states specifically scrutinize transactions to ensure that the
terms are “fair and reasonable”—i.e., that excessive fees are not
charged, and that the transactions are properly accounted for.117
Because the states, and not the federal government, have
traditionally regulated insurance companies, an insurer engaging in a
material transaction with an affiliate must not only satisfy its
domestic regulator, but must also meet the approval of the affiliate’s
domestic regulator. Similarly, different regulatory entities must give
their approval before a company’s funds may be paid as dividends up
through the corporate chain. Accordingly, each transaction may be
subject to multiple layers of review, thereby ensuring that
corporations within the holding company system are not subject to
undue domination or control and that they are not employed as
mere “sham” corporate entities. The Holding Company Act
authorizes insurance commissioners to conduct periodic
examinations to ensure that companies are complying with the
regulatory requirements.118
The NAIC publishes guidelines to coordinate efforts among
authorities responsible for regulating holding company systems that
aid regulators in obtaining “a general understanding of the
consolidated holding company structure and assess[] current and/or

116. Id. § 5(D), at 440-20.
117. Id. § 5, at 440-16. The Model Act contains other optional provisions designed to
lessen the dangers of excessive domination and control. For example, the Act provides that:
[n]ot less than one-third of the directors of a domestic insurer, and not less than
one-third of the members of each committee of the board of directors of any
domestic insurer shall be persons who are not officers or employees of the insurer or
of any entity controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the insurer
and who are not beneficial owners of a controlling interest in the voting stock of the
insurer or entity.
Id. § 5(C)(3), at 440-19; see also id. § 5(C)(4) (requiring the establishment of a committee of
independent directors that shall be responsible for recommending the selection of independent
certified public accountants and reviewing the insurer’s financial condition and the results of
any independent or internal audits).
118. Id. § 6, at 440-21; see also 4 BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS, supra note 73,
§ 128.15, at 128-48 to -51 (2005) (discussing examination procedures).
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potential risks to the insurance affiliates.”119 This multi-layer
regulatory framework that monitors the relationship between
companies functioning within insurance holding company systems
“focuse[s] on ‘walling off’ the insurance company from the holding
company” through “examinations of insurance companies on a state
by state basis.”120
2. Regulation of insurance subsidiaries
Insurance subsidiaries are also subject to direct regulation and
supervision by the insurance regulatory agencies of the states in
which they transact business. Each state has an insurance company
act that imposes certain regulatory requirements on the insurance
subsidiary wholly apart from their transactions within a holding
company system. State laws establish supervisory agencies with broad
regulatory authority, including the power to: (1) grant and revoke
business licenses; (2) regulate and supervise trade practices and
market conduct; (3) establish guaranty associations; (4) license
agents; (5) approve policy forms; (6) approve premium rates for
some lines of business; (7) establish reserve requirements; (8)
prescribe the form and content of required financial statements and
reports; (9) determine the reasonableness and adequacy of statutory
capital and surplus; (10) perform financial, market conduct, and
other examinations; (11) define acceptable accounting principles;
(12) regulate the type and amount of permitted investments; and
(13) limit the amount of dividends and surplus debenture payments
that can be paid without obtaining regulatory approval. Insurance
subsidiaries are subject to periodic examinations by state regulatory
authorities pursuant to such provisions.
In particular, the regulators closely monitor the insurance
subsidiary’s capitalization. Companies are required to file annual
statutory financial statements in the departments of insurance for the
states in which they engage in the business of selling and servicing
insurance policies. Regulators in each of these jurisdictions use such
financial statements along with other information in scrutinizing the
financial condition of the insurance subsidiary to ensure that it meets
capital, surplus, and reserve requirements on an ongoing basis.

119. NAIC, supra note 110, at 28.
120. Id. at 26.
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State statutes require companies to file annual financial
statements with their domestic regulators.121 Such financial
statements must be independently audited and must include, among
other things, the following information: “(1) [t]he report of the
insurer’s independent auditor[;] (2) [a] balance sheet reporting
admitted assets, liabilities, capital, and surplus[;] (3) [a] statement of
operations[;] (4) [a] statement of cash flow[; and] (5) [a] statement
of changes in capital and surplus.”122
State insurance regulations also require each insurer to prepare
and file an actuarial memorandum opining on the adequacy of the
company’s reserves.123 Each memorandum presents a detailed
analysis of the assumptions used to project future liabilities, the
assumptions used to project future earnings, and whether expected
future earnings plus reserves exceed expected liabilities. State
regulators scrutinize the actuarial memorandum’s conclusions
carefully and sometimes hire outside experts to determine the
reasonableness of a memorandum. As an added layer of oversight,
state departments of insurance perform periodic market conduct
examinations of insurers doing business in their state. As part of
these examinations, the regulators often examine, among other
things, the propriety of an insurer’s transactions within its holding
company system.
On the basis of statutory statements filed with state regulators
annually, the NAIC calculates certain financial ratios to assist state
regulators in monitoring the financial condition of insurance
companies. The NAIC’s risk-based capital (“RBC”) standards
establish capital requirements for insurance companies based on the
ratio of the company’s total adjusted capital (defined as the total of
its statutory capital, surplus, asset valuation reserve and certain other
adjustments) to its RBC. The standards are designed to help identify
companies that are undercapitalized and require specific regulatory
actions in the event an insurer’s RBC ratio falls below specified
levels.

121. See, e.g., 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/136 (2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-3.5-1
(1999); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 802.001 (Vernon 2007).
122. IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-3.5-7 (1999).
123. See 50 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 1408.10 (2008); 760 IND. ADMIN. CODE § 157-1 to -10 (2008); 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.1601 (2008).
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B. The Banking Industry
The banking industry has a similar regulatory framework that
protects against the potential hazards associated with intercompany
relationships. While regulation of banks is done primarily on the
federal rather than the state level,124 regulators closely monitor the
same risks posed by intercompany transactions to ensure the financial
stability of banks and other entities operating within holding
company systems.125
1. The Bank Holding Company Act
The Bank Holding Company Act governs holding company
systems in the banking industry and imposes certain requirements for
entities seeking to operate as bank holding companies. Among the
factors considered by the Federal Reserve in determining whether an
entity qualifies to function as a bank holding company are the
financial strength of the entity and whether it is adequately
capitalized.126 By regulating entry into the industry, the Act provides
regulators with powerful tools to ensure that holding company
systems are financially sound and to protect against corporate entities
that are designed to function as mere sham corporations or to
function in a fraudulent manner.
Federal law also imposes regulatory requirements that apply to
the operations of the holding company and its subsidiaries. Among
other things, the Act imposes restrictions regarding intercompany
transactions that are similar to those found in the insurance industry.
Within a holding company structure, transactions among corporate
entities are subject to significant regulation to ensure that these
entities conduct transactions on an arms-length basis.
The Federal Reserve Act likewise provides several safeguards to
ensure the financial stability of regulated banking entities. Section
23A of the Act places restrictions on a variety of transactions,
including loans, purchases of securities and other assets, and

124. There are also state regulations that mirror the provisions of the Bank Holding
Company Act. See generally 3 BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS, supra note 73,
§§ 121.03[C], 123.04[B], 123.05, 123.06–.10, at 123-13 to -42.
125. See id. § 121.05, at 121-36 (“The general thrust of bank holding company
regulation is to bolster the safety and soundness regulation of the banks they own.”).
126. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.14(c) (2007).
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accommodations between banks and their affiliates.127 There is a
quantitative restriction on the total amount of transactions among
affiliates: they may not exceed twenty percent of bank capital and
surplus. Moreover, § 23A prohibits transactions amounting to more
than ten percent of capital and surplus with any affiliate.128 There are
also qualitative restrictions to ensure that banks comply with safe and
sound banking practices.129 Likewise, § 23B of the Act requires that
bank holding companies complete other transactions on an arm’s
length basis.130 These requirements are designed to prevent selfdealing among affiliated entities and to ensure the continued
financial stability of regulated entities.
The regulations also impose capital restrictions that are designed
to ensure that banks are adequately capitalized.131 Thus, much like
the regulations governing the insurance industry, a key function of
the regulations is to ensure that none of the corporate entities in a
holding company system are undermined through intercompany
transactions. In addition, the regulations specifically provide that
holding companies must refrain from any actions that “constitute[] a
serious risk to the financial safety, soundness, or stability of a
subsidiary bank.”132 Indeed, the regulations go so far as to suggest
that a bank holding company must maintain financial resources to
assist its subsidiaries if necessary and “serve as a source of financial
and managerial strength to its subsidiary banks.”133
As in the insurance industry, regulators have significant powers
to undertake reviews to ensure banks meet these regulatory
requirements. The Bank Holding Company Act, for example,
provides for inspection of records in order to ensure that the
regulatory requirements are met.134
127. 12 U.S.C. § 371c (2000).
128. Id. § 371c(a)(1)(A)–(B), (b)(8).
129. See id. § 371c(a)(4), (b)(10), (c)(1)–(2).
130. See id. § 371c-1(a)(1)(A)–(B).
131. 12 C.F.R. § 225 App. A (2007); see generally 3 BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE
GROUPS, supra note 73, § 121.01, at 121-4 (“[T]he bank holding company regulatory
scheme seems to take an entity approach when it requires individual banks to be capitalized in
accordance with regulatory guidelines or when it requires banks to be formed and maintained
in accordance with special rules designed to respect the integrity of the bank as a separate
entity within the holding company structure.”).
132. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(2) (2007).
133. Id. § 225.4(a)(1).
134. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c) (2000); see also 3 BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS, supra
note 73, § 123.13[A], at 123-49 (“The federal statutes . . . provide the federal regulatory
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2. Regulation of banking and other subsidiaries
Likewise, as in the insurance industry, there are regulations
governing the financial subsidiaries of national banks. Under the
National Bank Act, the Comptroller of the Currency may regulate
the charters for national commercial banks.135 Among the factors
regulators consider in determining whether to grant a charter are the
adequacy of the bank’s capital structure and its financial history and
condition.136 In determining whether a bank may become a member
of the Federal Reserve System, regulators look at similar factors,
including the financial history of the bank and the adequacy of its
capital structure.137
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act loosened the restrictions on the
activities in which banks or their affiliates may engage, but at the
same time provided that a national bank must have reasonable
procedures and policies designed to preserve the bank’s limited
liability by separating the bank from its financial subsidiaries.138 In
addition, the Act requires financial subsidiaries of banks to comply
with the restrictions on transactions among corporate entities found
in §§ 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act.139 Finally, the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act further provides that the Comptroller of
the Currency, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC shall issue
“prudential safeguards” to ensure that transactions within the
holding company structure are appropriate.140
Thus, as in the insurance industry, there are multiple layers of
regulation seeking to ensure the independence of corporate entities
functioning within a holding company system. While the regulation
in the banking industry occurs primarily at the federal level, many of
the goals and effects of the regulatory system are the same. As a
result, the regulatory framework in the banking industry, as in the

authorities with broad powers of supervision, and they do so on a pervasive enterprise basis.
Under the Bank Holding Company Act, the Fed has the power to require reports and examine
bank holding companies and their subsidiaries, bank and nonbank, federally chartered or state
chartered.”).
135. 12 U.S.C. § 21 (2000).
136. 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(f)(i)(A)–(E) (2007).
137. See 12 U.S.C. § 1815 (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 208.5(a)(1) (2007).
138. 12 U.S.C. § 24a (2000).
139. See 12 U.S.C. § 371c (2000).
140. 12 U.S.C. § 1828a (2000).
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insurance industry, ensures that many of the potential dangers that
veil piercing is designed to remedy do not occur.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR SOME MODEST LIMITATIONS ON VEIL
PIERCING CLAIMS
Compliance with such regulations, in essence, demonstrates that
the requirements that are typically cited in veil piercing cases cannot
be met. Accordingly, there is a strong argument that applying the
veil piercing doctrines in such regulated industries is simply
inappropriate. At a minimum, the regulators’ judgment that an
entity has complied with these requirements should be entitled to
significant judicial deference.141 “Where an agency is charged with
responsibility for regulating a complex industry, it is much better
equipped than the courts, ‘by specialization, by insight gained
through experience, and by more flexible procedure,’ to gather the
relevant facts that underlie a particular claim involving that
industry.”142 Indeed, courts have long recognized that, in general,
deference is warranted given such agencies’ “expertise in
ascertaining, interpreting and distilling the facts and circumstances
underlying the legal issues.”143 Moreover, “[w]here . . . a regulatory
agency possesses such extensive authority and control over a
particular subject matter, and where consideration of the same
subject matter is sought before that agency and the courts, the
possibility of a judicial-administrative conflict should be avoided.”144

141. Courts generally give such regulatory determinations significant deference. See, e.g.,
Indus. Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 505 F.2d 152, 157–58 (9th Cir. 1974);
Simi Corp. v. Garamendi, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 207, 214 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Yamaha
Corp. of Am. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1998)) (noting that
courts “giv[e] deference to the determination of the agency appropriate to the circumstances
of the agency action”); In re Comm’r’s Failure to Adopt 861 CPT Codes, 817 A.2d 355, 363
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (“This court allows substantial deference to the
interpretation of the agency charged with enforcing an act. Particularly in the insurance field,
the expertise and judgment of the Commissioner may be allowed great weight.”) (citations
omitted); Foster v. Mutual Fire, Marine and Inland Ins. Co., 614 A.2d 1086, 1093 (Pa. 1992)
(“[G]reat deference in favor of the Insurance Commissioner and the resulting narrow scope of
review for the courts are in recognition of the expertise of the administrative agency or
individual officer assigned the task of regulating a given industry.”).
142. Indus. Commc’ns Sys., Inc., 505 F.2d at 157 (citing Far E. Conference v. United
States, 342 U.S. 570, 575 (1952)).
143. Id.
144. Id. (citing Carter v. AT&T Co., 365 F.2d 486, 495 (5th Cir. 1966)).
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Federalism concerns may also counsel in favor of strong
deference where a suit is brought in the federal courts seeking to
pierce the veil of a state-regulated entity. The deference accorded
state insurance regulators by the federal courts is particularly strong
given that “[i]nsurance regulation has long been recognized as an
area of traditional state concern.”145 Thus, federal courts in a variety
of contexts have recognized “a strong federal policy of deferring to
state regulation of the insurance industry.”146
Economic theory suggests that the veil piercing theories are
counterproductive in regulated industries such as insurance and
banking. In such industries, all of the benefits of limited liability may
be realized while at the same time largely dispensing with the
associated costs. Because the regulatory framework seeks to prevent
the same conduct that veil piercing doctrines were designed to
remedy, it provides a ready substitute for mitigating the potential
costs of limited liability. Moreover, entities operating in such
industries already incur the costs associated with reducing the
hazards of intercompany interactions; it makes no sense to incur
both the costs of veil piercing and those of the regulatory structure.
Because the costs of regulation are already being incurred, it makes
sense to eliminate the duplicative set of costs attributable to veil
piercing.
The strong arguments in favor of abandoning veil piercing in
such regulated industries appear to be borne out in practice where
there seems to be a de facto, albeit largely unrecognized, prohibition
on such claims. Given the heavily regulated nature of the industry
and rigid separation imposed upon regulated entities, for example, it
is not surprising that courts routinely reject attempts to pierce the
corporate veil of entities operating in the insurance industry.147
145. Gross v. Weingarten, 217 F.3d 208, 223 (4th Cir. 2000).
146. Murff v. Prof’l Med. Ins. Co., 97 F.3d 289, 293 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Wolfson
v. Mutual Benenfit Life Ins. Co., 51 F.3d 141, 147 (8th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
147. See, e.g., Nobles v. Rural Cmty. Ins. Servs., 303 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1288 (M.D. Ala.
2004) (holding that there was “no evidence” that parent controlled operations of insurance
subsidiary); Wady v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (C.D.
Cal. 2002); Forest v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., 2001 WL 1338809, at *9
(N.D. Cal. June 12, 2001) (“The Court concludes that no genuine issues of material fact exist
to support the alter ego argument and [the insurance company’s parent] is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”); Bejcek v. Allied Life Fin. Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1112
(S.D. Iowa 2001) (rejecting argument that parent was alter ego of insurance company on
ground that “[d]efendants’ alter-ego argument is without merit”); Smith v. S&S Dundalk
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Likewise, veil piercing seems to be exceedingly rare in the banking
industry.148 However, these decisions are utterly devoid of any
theoretical analysis regarding the inappropriateness of applying alter
ego principles in such regulated industries. Rather, courts typically
apply the standard multifactor analysis used in other veil piercing
cases. Nonetheless, a more general analysis of these factors dictates
that alter ego liability is, at a more fundamental level, inappropriate
in such regulated industries. The regulatory environment in which
such companies operate undercuts any theory of alter ego liability in
several ways.
A. The Relationship Between Traditional Requirements for Piercing
the Corporate Veil and the Regulatory Framework
The traditional standards for piercing the corporate veil have
little application in the heavily regulated insurance and banking
industries. Indeed, the regulatory framework of these industries act
to assuage traditional veil piercing concerns such as domination and
control, capitalization, questionable inter-corporate transactions, and
commingling of assets.
1. Domination and control
As noted above, veil piercing typically requires “complete
domination ‘in respect to the transaction attacked’ so that the [other
defendants] had ‘at the time’ no separate will of [their] own.”149
However, the series of “legal firewalls” between the holding
company and its affiliated entities found in the insurance and
banking industries, for example, effectively prohibits any improper

Eng’g Works, Ltd., 139 F. Supp. 2d 610 (D.N.J. 2001) (granting motion to dismiss in favor
of insurance company parent); Jemez Agency, Inc. v. CIGNA Corp., 866 F. Supp. 1340
(D.N.M. 1994); Am. Home Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 122 Cal. App. 3d 951 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1981).
148. See, e.g., Bentler v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n, No. 88-6271, 1989
WL 150139, at *3 (9th Cir. Dec. 6, 1989); Marshall & Ilsley Corp. v. Heimann, 652 F.2d
685 (7th Cir. 1981); Reinke v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 4:04-CV-1758, 2005 WL 3454428
(E.D. Mo. Dec. 16, 2005); Guining Li v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 99-C-635-C, 2000 WL
34237511, at *3 (W.D. Wis. July 26, 2000); Leuthold v. Camp, 273 F. Supp. 695, 702 (D.
Mont. 1967); Main Bank of Chi. v. Baker, 427 N.E.2d 94, 101–02 (Ill. 1981); Richardson v.
Bank of Am., N.A., 643 S.E.2d 410, 421–22 (N.C. App. Ct. 2007). But cf. In re Jarax Int’l,
Inc., 122 B.R. 793 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990) (piercing veil to reach subsidiary of parent bank).
149. Am. Protein Corp. v. AB Volvo, 844 F.2d 56, 60 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting
Lowendahl v. Baltimore & Ohio RR, 287 N.Y.S. 62, 76 (App. Div. 1936)).

1201

SMITH.FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/20/2008 11:20 AM

[2008

domination or control. Because regulators closely monitor
transactions among corporations on an ongoing basis, the dangers of
inappropriate intercompany interactions are significantly mitigated.
Likewise, an important aspect of this regulatory scheme is a
comprehensive system of financial reporting and accounting that is
dictated by statute and regulation. The reporting requirements in the
insurance industry, for example, include extensive annual statements
that disclose all of the company’s revenues, expenses, obligations,
and assets. These disclosures include a listing of each investment and
its risk rating as determined by the NAIC.150 The regulations ensure
that an insurance company is not a mere “shell,” as alter ego liability
requires, but a distinct corporate entity whose obligations are backed
by substantial assets.
Moreover, the regulators in such industries monitor companies
to ensure that they observe corporate formalities and that any
overlap in corporate board or officers does not lead to any undue
influence or control. Thus, the regulatory regime at the same time
acknowledges the utility of the holding company structure and puts
in place checks and balances to ensure that it is not abused. While
the regulators’ primary purpose in monitoring such entities may be
to protect the interests of policyholders or deposit holders, this
regulatory structure has more wide-ranging benefits in preventing
fraud or abuse of the corporate form.
2. Adequate capitalization
The regulatory framework likewise seeks to ensure that corporate
entities are adequately capitalized. Insurance regulators, for example,
using their own conservative benchmarks, set capitalization
requirements for insurance companies and then monitor the finances
of these companies to assess the adequacy of their capital. Regulators
are charged with the responsibility of ensuring the solvency of the
subsidiary corporate entities. When there are concerns about a
company’s finances, regulators may intervene to ensure that the
company retains sufficient funds to meet its obligations to
policyholders. As a result, the regulatory framework ensures that
companies are adequately capitalized, thereby undermining a key
component of alter ego liability.
150. See 215 ILL. COMP. ANN. 5/136 (2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-3.5-1 (1999);
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 802.052–.056 (Vernon 2007).
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In particular, the regulators monitor transactions that may
impact a company’s working capital. For example, a company may be
required to give notice of ordinary dividends and to receive approval
for extraordinary dividends. The regulators may also require
dividends to be drawn from surplus capital.151 And the regulators
may not allow a company to “make any payments in the form of
dividends or otherwise” unless it “possess[ed] assets in the amount
of such payment, in excess of its liabilities, including its capital
stock.”152 In approving corporate dividends, regulators specifically
consider “whether an insurer’s surplus is reasonable in relation to the
insurer’s outstanding liabilities and adequate to its financial
needs.”153 In doing so, regulators ensure that corporate entities
remain adequately capitalized.
Likewise, the capitalization of banks is closely monitored by
regulators.154 Holding companies are prohibited from taking actions
that may undermine a subsidiary’s financial resources or “financial
safety” and “soundness.”155 Piercing the corporate veil in regulated
industries would require courts to second-guess the judgment of
these regulators.
3. Inter-corporate transactions
Like the veil piercing doctrines, the regulatory framework in the
insurance and banking industries also acts to prevent improper
transactions between a parent company and its subsidiaries. Indeed,
the extent to which these regulatory frameworks prevent improper
domination or control is impressive. Because each material
transaction between corporate entities is subject to oversight, these
frameworks can be particularly effective in preventing abuse of the
corporate form. As noted above, for example, insurance regulations
strictly limit the movement of capital from an insurance subsidiary to
a holding company or its affiliates. These regulations prohibit
insurance companies from paying dividends beyond a specified level
without obtaining prior regulatory approval and require regulatory

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See MODEL ACT § 4(E), 5(B), at 440-15, 440-18 to -19.
Id.
IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-23-4(f) (1999).
See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.14(b), 225 App. A (2007).
12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(2) (2007).
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approval of agreements between insurance companies and their
affiliates.156
Regulators therefore prohibit the sort of “siphoning” of funds
from a holding company through dividends or exorbitant
administrative or investment advisory fees that plaintiffs may allege in
attempting to pierce the corporate veil. The dividends paid upstream
through the holding company system are registered and, in some
instances, approved by multiple regulatory entities. Moreover, the
regulators review and approve each intercompany payment and
transfer and each affiliate agreement that plaintiffs might cite in an
attempt to establish an alter ego relationship. These regulators
review investment advisory agreements, administrative services
agreements, and tax sharing agreements to determine whether all of
the agreements are “fair and reasonable” and based on arm’s-length
transactions.157
Likewise, regulators monitor transactions in bank holding
company systems to ensure that they are consistent with sound
banking policy and are conducted on an arms-length basis.158 The
regulatory framework is specifically designed to ensure that
transactions among related entities are not used to undermine
banking subsidiaries, and indeed the regulations specifically preclude
extensive intercompany transactions by placing quantitative
limitations on the amount of such transactions.159
4. Commingling of assets
Finally, regulations may also prevent the “commingling of
assets” that is a standard element of veil piercing claims. Affiliated
entities in the insurance industry, for example, typically have their
own separate bank accounts and accounting records. Premiums
received from policyholders are deposited, maintained, and
controlled by the entity that holds the policies. Commissions to
agents are disbursed from accounts the company owns and controls.

156. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-23-1.5, 23-4 (1999).
157. Such intercompany transactions are not uncommon in the insurance industry.
“Insurance subsidiaries generally fund debt service and other obligations of their holding
company through a combination of dividends, tax sharing payments and other expense
allocation agreements with their holding company.” 2004 Best’s Insurance Reports—
Life/Health, at xiii.
158. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 371c (2000).
159. See id. § 371c(a)(1)(A)–(B), (b)(8).
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Regulatory audits ensure that an entity’s accounting systems properly
support the financial reports that are required by the regulations.
These legal firewalls ensure that corporations’ finances remain
separate and distinct.
Because the regulatory framework in which these companies
operate establishes such legal firewalls, imposition of alter ego
liability is particularly inappropriate. The regulatory framework fully
accounts for the factors courts typically consider in determining
whether to impose such liability, thereby ensuring that the conduct
necessary to support such claims does not occur.
Moreover, the regulators have developed specialized expertise in
applying these standards in a particular industry. That expertise
warrants preventing the courts from second guessing regulatory
judgments. Indeed, in the insurance context, the regulatory
framework imposes much more stringent requirements than would
be imposed by the courts. The detailed monitoring of each material
corporate transaction—often by multiple regulatory authorities—is
far more demanding than the analysis typically employed by courts in
ascertaining whether to pierce the corporate veil. Finally, there is
inefficiency in having both regulators and the courts resolve the same
questions. Judicial resources can be conserved by allowing such
issues to remain where they belong—with the regulators.
B. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Not only does abandonment of the veil piercing doctrines in the
context of regulated industries make sense within the framework
articulated by the courts, it also makes sense from an economic
perspective. A wide range of law and economics scholars have argued
that the veil piercing doctrines are best viewed as an attempt to
engage in a cost-benefit analysis, which seeks to retain limited
liability in circumstances where its benefits outweigh its costs and
articulate certain exceptions to this general rule where the costs
outweigh the benefits.160

160. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 87, at 77 (“A standard academic approach treats veil
piercing as a safety valve allowing courts to address cases in which the externalities associated
with limited liability seem excessive.”); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 109 (“The [veil
piercing] cases may be understood, at least roughly, as attempts to balance the benefits of
limited liability against its costs. Courts are more likely to allow creditors to reach the assets of
shareholders where limited liability provides minimal gains from improved liquidity and
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1. Benefits of limited liability
The traditional rule of limited liability for corporate shareholders
may be justified on several grounds summarized in a classic article by
Easterbrook and Fischel, and embellished in subsequent work by
other law and economics scholars.161 First, limited liability reduces
the economic costs of equity investment.162 Aside from the obvious
reduction in cost associated with rigid rules prohibiting claims
against shareholders, limited liability decreases shareholders’ “need
to monitor” the corporation, as well as the potential liability they
may incur to creditors absent such restrictions.163 In doing so, it
encourages economic investment and the growth of organized
markets. Conversely, abandoning limited liability may result in
shareholder free riding. If there is no limited liability, “only a
fraction of the gains expected from effective monitoring will go to
the monitor.”164 The overall result may be a decrease in monitoring
of corporate managers.
Second, some commentators argue that limited liability also
eliminates the costs of “monitoring other shareholders.”165 Because
any judgments must be satisfied by the holdings of the shareholders
in the absence of limited liability, shareholders have an incentive to
monitor the wealth of all the other shareholders. While this factor
may not be the most significant of those identified, to the extent it
plays a role at all, it increases the costs associated with abandoning
limited liability.

diversification, while creating a high probability that a firm will engage in a socially excessive
level of risk taking.”).
161. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2; see also infra notes 162–82 (discussing
scholarly work building on Easterbrook and Fischel’s analysis).
162. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural
Lens, 106 HARV. L. REV. 387, 390 (1992); Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 499; Leebron, supra
note 78, at 1573; Presser, supra note 1, at 408.
163. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 94; Thompson, supra note 20, at 18
(“Unlimited liability . . . can affect the market indirectly to the extent that it impacts on the
amount of monitoring.”).
164. Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 491–92; see also Ribstein, supra note 1, at 103.
165. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 95; Thompson, supra note 20, at 32–33
(“[L]arge transaction costs are likely to be incurred in a move to extended liability; these costs
include excessive monitoring and evasion strategies exceeding what now occurs.”).
Easterbrook and Fischel also argue that limited liability reduces the cost of monitoring
management because creditors may “possess a comparative advantage in monitoring particular
managerial actions.” Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 100.
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Third, commentators have suggested that limited liability
facilitates the “free transfer of shares” and thus “gives managers
incentives to act efficiently.”166 Limited liability facilitates the transfer
of shares because all shares are valued equally and are “fungible”; the
identity and wealth of other investors is irrelevant to the value of
particular shares.167 If limited liability were abandoned, the value of
shares would not be determined by the cash flows of the corporation,
but rather would be dependent in part on these other factors. For
the same reason, limited liability allows the share price to embody
information about the actual “value of firms.”168 As a result, investors
need not necessarily do their own research before purchasing but,
assuming market efficiency, can have some confidence in the
market’s valuation of a particular share.169 Without limited liability,
there would be a significant danger that organized markets could not
function efficiently, or at all, given the barriers shareholder liability
may impose on the free transfer of shares.
Fourth, limited liability affords shareholders an opportunity to
diversify their holdings. Without limited liability, shareholders would
be unlikely to hold a wide array of stocks under circumstances in
which their personal holdings would be put at risk, and thus would
be denied an important mechanism for reducing risk.170 Rather, they
would more likely focus on only a few companies where they could
better monitor management. The costs associated with increased
monitoring would limit the scope of investment. Limited liability
thereby ensures the benefits of diversification. Although critics have
argued that a rule of proportional liability would eliminate the need
for limited liability to ensure diversification,171 commentators

166. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 95.
167. Id. at 95–96.
168. Id. at 96.
169. Id.
170. Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 491 (“A rule of personal liability . . . would decrease
shareholders’ ability to invest in a diverse portfolio of investments. The greater the degree of
monitoring of each investment required, the fewer investments that will be made.”);
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 96 (“limited liability allows more efficient
diversification”); Thompson, supra note 20, at 32 (“[E]xtended liability will have a significant
negative effect on the ability of shareholders to diversify, which in turn removes their riskbearing advantage and more generally will remove the standardized pricing of shares that has
contributed significantly to the growth and development of liquid financial markets for
shares.”).
171. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3.
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continue to argue that this is a powerful reason for continuing with
the traditional approach.
Fifth, limited liability prevents managers from becoming overly
risk averse and rejecting projects that may have a positive net present
value. According to Easterbrook and Fischel, this is “the real benefit
of limited liability.”172 In the absence of limited liability, corporate
managers would not undertake projects that may benefit society as a
whole but involve inherent risks because they would fear that courts
would impose shareholder liability.
Finally, commentators have suggested that the transaction costs
of bringing suit against numerous shareholders spread across the
country (and in foreign jurisdictions)—which would be required if
limited liability were abandoned—would be prohibitive.173 Given the
practical difficulties and costs associated with imposing liability on
corporate shareholders, any benefits derived from abolishing limited
liability would be fleeting. Likewise, eliminating limited liability may
increase the monitoring costs incurred by creditors who may be
forced to monitor numerous shareholders in order to ensure that
claims could be satisfied.174
2. Mitigation of costs
While some commentators have questioned these benefits of
limited liability (albeit, less than completely persuasively), to the
extent these benefits exist, they apply with equal weight in the
context of regulated industries.175 Moreover, the regulatory
framework eliminates or reduces certain of the potential costs of
limited liability asserted by commentators. As one commentator has
observed, “[w]ith limited liability, some business people will be
tempted to cheat their creditors by obtaining credit when they know
172. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 97.
173. Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 492 (arguing that “it would be prohibitively costly for
the creditor of a corporation to bring individual suits against thousands of geographically
diverse investors”); see also id. at 497 (“A related source of administrative costs for both tort
creditors and society-at-large arises out of the difficulty of deciding which investors are liable
on particular claims.”); Leebron, supra note 78, at 1611 (“The transaction costs of collecting
the pro rata shares against typical individual shareholders would in almost every case be so high
that it would not be worth it. The uncertain application of the rule would create substantial
uncertainty.”).
174. Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 492–93.
175. See, e.g., Booth, supra note 95, at 147 (“None of the arguments in favor of limited
liability is ultimately persuasive.”).

1208

SMITH.FIN

1165]

10/20/2008 11:20 AM

Piercing the Corporate Veil in Regulated Industries

they are unlikely to be able to repay or to cheat their customers and
innocent third parties by knowingly selling dangerous products and
services without adequate capital or insurance.”176 The regulatory
framework mitigates these dangers by reducing the moral hazard
problem associated with the externalization of risk where limited
liability applies.
First, the regulatory scheme significantly reduces the danger of
undercapitalization. Undercapitalization increases the risks associated
with limited liability because “the lower the amount of the firm’s
capital, the greater the incentive to engage in excessively risky
activities.”177 The constant monitoring of firms’ capitalization in the
insurance and banking industries coupled with minimum capital
requirements reduces the risk of undercapitalization and the
concomitant risk that management may have an incentive to
externalize costs for projects that would not have a net positive
present value absent such externalization.
Indeed, as Easterbrook and Fischel observed in their seminal
article, “[l]egislatively imposed minimum-capitalization requirements
are one method of internalizing the cost of risk taking.”178 It is
exactly this sort of legislatively imposed requirement that mitigates
the costs of limited liability within regulated industries such as the
insurance and banking industries. Moreover, while Easterbrook and
Fischel observe that there are obvious costs associated with such
requirements, such as administrative costs and the cost of setting
capital requirements too high179—and thus imposing minimum
capitalization requirements may be a less desirable means of
controlling moral hazard than the veil piercing doctrines—the fact
that these requirements already exist in regulated industries means
that these costs will be incurred anyway. Having incurred these costs,
it is foolish not to reap the associated benefits and instead insist on
the continuation of the veil piercing doctrines in such regulated
industries. Veil piercing merely imposes additional costs without
achieving any greater benefits (or at least benefits that are sufficiently
great that they justify the additional costs).

176. Id. at 161.
177. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 113.
178. Id. at 114.
179. Id. (arguing that “the rate of return on equity investments will decrease” if
minimum capital requirements are adopted across the board).
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Second, direct “regulation of inputs” reduces the likelihood that
managers will engage in unduly risky activities.180 As Easterbrook and
Fischel observe, direct regulation of the business activities of
corporations can be used to prevent the externalization of risk where
inappropriate.181 This is exactly the situation in the insurance and
banking industries, in which regulators directly monitor corporate
activities to ensure that corporations do not engage in overly risky
activities. Again, Easterbrook and Fischel argue that this means of
addressing the moral hazard problem may not be superior to veil
piercing because “[r]egulators have no better incentives than market
participants to balance the social costs and benefits of engaging in
certain activities.”182 However, like the rules governing capitalization,
this is a system that is already in place. It makes no sense to incur the
costs of duplicative mechanisms to control the same moral hazard
problem when there is no evidence that there will be any incremental
benefit, much less an incremental benefit that outweighs the
significant additional costs.
In sum, the costs of allowing veil piercing within regulated
industries such as the insurance and banking industries significantly
outweigh the benefits. Corporations functioning within such
regulatory systems are already subject to multiple mechanisms
designed to control the moral hazard problem. These mechanisms,
like veil piercing, impose costs on society. Allowing veil piercing
under such circumstances merely adds additional costs without any
demonstrable additional benefits. Thus, from an economic
perspective, veil piercing within such regulated industries simply
makes no sense.
V. CONCLUSION
The debate over limited liability and the proper scope of the veil
piercing doctrines is likely to continue unabated given its significant
practical importance and the lack of concrete empirical data to
support the arguments on either side. Nonetheless, within this
debate, there may be some common ground upon which scholars

180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 116 (“Whether the social costs of regulation exceed the social costs of
excessively risky activities is an empirical question.”).
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and commentators can reach a consensus. This Article attempts to
identify one such area.
Regulated industries such as insurance and banking provide a
forum in which all commentators should agree that veil piercing is
inappropriate and that the benefits of strict limited liability should be
preserved. Regulation is an independent means by which the dangers
of interactions among shareholders and corporate entities may be
mitigated. Accordingly, it reduces the potential costs associated with
limited liability that some commentators have suggested warrant
erosion of such guarantees. At the same time, it retains many of the
widely-recognized benefits of limited liability, which may be in some
part responsible for the significant economic progress of our nation
over the last two centuries. Accordingly, where such regulatory
frameworks exist, the veil piercing doctrines should be abandoned.
Indeed, the courts may already be applying such a de facto rule.
Because these regulatory frameworks largely preclude the sort of
conduct that courts have traditionally cited as justifying veil piercing,
the actual application of such doctrines in these regulated industries
appears to be rare.
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